September 26, 2026
Police can track a cellphone, but the technology they use and the authority they obtain matter. A warrant is generally required for constitutionally protected location searches, and Texas has a specific warrant requirement for certain location information obtained from service providers. Emergencies can change the analysis. There is no single rule that answers every kind of phone tracking.
A September 24, 2026 decision addresses a particularly intrusive method: police equipment that imitates a cell tower and draws a signal directly from a phone. In Andrews v. Baltimore City Police Department, the Fourth Circuit majority said using a cell-site simulator to locate a phone was a Fourth Amendment search requiring a valid warrant. Police had used the device to find Andrews inside a townhome.
That is a significant privacy ruling. It is not a nationwide ban on police tracking, and it does not automatically get evidence excluded in a Texas case. The court actually affirmed judgment for the defendants in Andrews’s civil lawsuit.
What a cell-site simulator does
A cell-site simulator imitates a cellular tower. Nearby phones identify it as a connection point and send identifying signals. Officers can use those signals to narrow down the location of a target phone. The equipment in Andrews was called Hailstorm; the opinion identifies Stingray as its predecessor. People often use “Stingray” when discussing this type of police surveillance.
This is different from asking a phone company for records. With a simulator, police collect the location information directly by interacting with the phone. In the circumstances described in Andrews, the technology also connected with other nearby phones using the same service provider.
It is also different from searching the contents of a seized phone. Finding where a phone is, reading its messages, and retrieving its historical location records are separate investigative steps. An order authorizing one step should not simply be assumed to authorize all of them.
How Baltimore police found Andrews
In 2014, Baltimore detectives investigating a shooting obtained an arrest warrant for Kerron Andrews. They also obtained a pen-register order with language addressing cellphone location information and tracking. Records from his provider narrowed the search to an area containing about 35 townhomes, but did not identify the particular home.
Officers then walked through the area with Hailstorm. The simulator connected with Andrews’s phone and located it inside a specific townhome. A resident consented to entry. Officers found Andrews on a couch with the phone in his pocket. They later obtained and executed a search warrant for the home and found a gun in the couch.
The simulator’s role was not disclosed to the defense until about a year into the criminal proceedings. Maryland courts suppressed evidence, and the prosecution dropped the criminal case. The September 2026 federal opinion arose from Andrews’s later civil suit for damages, not a new appeal deciding whether to suppress evidence in that criminal case.
The sequence matters. “Police had a warrant” does not explain which warrant they had, when they obtained it, or what it authorized. An arrest warrant, an order directed to a carrier, a simulator deployment, consent to enter a home, and a later house-search warrant must be examined separately.
What the Fourth Circuit decided—and what it left open
The majority concluded that using a cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search and stated that a valid warrant was required. Its reasoning emphasized the precision of the location information, the use of technology to locate someone inside a private residence, and the government’s direct interaction with the phone. The search was not outside constitutional protection simply because it produced a brief location snapshot rather than a lengthy movement history.
But the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The detectives received qualified immunity because the relevant constitutional rule was not clearly established when they acted in 2014. The court also rejected the Maryland constitutional claims on public-official-immunity grounds and found insufficient evidence to impose municipal liability.
Qualified immunity is a civil-liability defense. It is not the same question as whether evidence can be used against a defendant in a criminal prosecution. A privacy ruling and a loss in a damages lawsuit can exist in the same opinion.
There is another limit worth stating plainly. In footnote 10, the majority expressly declined to decide whether the particular pen-register order satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Judge Quattlebaum agreed with the judgment but believed the order met that requirement. He also questioned the precedential value of resolving parts of the constitutional analysis without deciding the order’s validity.
The decision therefore does not establish that every document labeled a pen-register order is necessarily insufficient. Its substance, supporting application, and scope still require review. Nor does the opinion establish that every form of real-time tracking is governed by an identical rule.
What this means for Texans
Andrews is a published Fourth Circuit decision, not a decision binding Texas courts merely because it comes from a federal appeals court. Texas is within the Fifth Circuit. Its reasoning may support a defense argument, but the controlling authorities, applicable Texas statutes, and particular search must be analyzed independently.
The Supreme Court’s June 29, 2026 decision in Chatrie v. United States is part of that analysis. The Court held that acquiring Chatrie’s Google Location History was a Fourth Amendment search, even though the data covered only a limited period and was held by a third party. It remanded for further consideration of the warrant’s probable cause and particularity. It did not ban every geofence warrant. Our separate discussion of Google location data and geofence warrants addresses that different method of investigation.
Earlier Fifth Circuit cases need careful treatment after Chatrie. For example, the unpublished February 26, 2025 decision in United States v. Briseno left open whether acquiring real-time cell-site location information was a search and upheld the challenged acquisition on exigent-circumstances grounds. That pre-Chatrie decision should not be presented as a definitive current rule allowing all warrantless real-time tracking.
Texas has a separate rule for certain provider-held location information
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 18B.321–18B.326 address required disclosure of location information held electronically by a service provider and created after issuance of the warrant. Article 18B.322 requires a warrant for that disclosure. Article 18B.323 requires facts establishing the specified probable-cause grounds, including that disclosure will produce evidence of an offense under investigation or result in the apprehension of a fugitive.
Those provisions concern provider disclosure of prospective location information. They should not be described as a statute that automatically answers every question about a simulator collecting signals directly from a phone.
Article 18B.325 permits emergency disclosure under defined conditions, including a reasonable belief that an immediate life-threatening situation requires disclosure before a warrant can be obtained with due diligence. The officer must obtain a warrant within 48 hours after requiring that disclosure. Article 18B.326 restricts use of the covered information as evidence unless the warrant requirements are met.
Calling an investigation urgent does not by itself establish this statutory exception. The facts supporting the claimed emergency, the time of disclosure, and the timing of the subsequent warrant are concrete matters to check.
What the defense should examine in a tracking case
The practical lesson is to reconstruct how police got from a phone number to a person or address. A report that says officers “located the suspect” may not answer that question. In a Harris County, Montgomery County, Fort Bend County, or federal prosecution, the records needed will depend on the method used—not just the label in the report.
- The actual technology: Was the location supplied by a carrier, retrieved from an app’s stored records, or obtained by a simulator? Were several methods used in sequence?
- The judicial authorization: Review the application, affidavit, signed order, permitted dates, target identifiers, and any extensions. Compare what the judge authorized with what officers actually did.
- The deployment and collection records: Seek available logs, timestamps, location estimates, operator reports, and records explaining how a target device was distinguished from other phones.
- The emergency claim: Identify the specific danger, when officers learned about it, why obtaining a warrant first was impracticable, and what later authorization was obtained.
- The chain to later evidence: Determine whether tracking led to an entry, arrest, statement, or additional warrant. A challenge requires attention to those connections and any claimed independent source.
This is not only a constitutional inquiry. Location evidence identifies a device, and the prosecution’s conclusion that a particular person possessed it at a particular moment may require additional proof. Precision, timing, and attribution are separate issues. A strong location estimate does not answer all three.
Nor does a defect necessarily end the prosecution. The State may dispute whether the defendant can challenge the search, argue that the authorization was adequate, invoke a recognized exception, or contend that later evidence is admissible despite the challenged search. Those arguments require case-specific analysis, not a promise that an article or newly issued opinion will produce dismissal.
If phone tracking appears in your case
Keep the warrants, court papers, provider notices, and other records you already have. Do not delete data or reset a device to try to change the evidence. Before offering investigators an explanation of where a phone was or who had it, discuss the allegation and available records with counsel.
The Napier Law Firm represents people facing criminal charges in Houston, Conroe, and surrounding Harris, Montgomery, and Fort Bend County communities. If location evidence helped police find you or build a case, the review should start with the actual collection method and legal authorization. Learn about our federal criminal defense representation or request a consultation.
Legal developments discussed as of September 26, 2026. Andrews was issued September 24, 2026; this article does not represent that a final mandate has issued or that further review is concluded. This article provides general information, not legal advice. Reading it or contacting the firm does not by itself create an attorney-client relationship. Outcomes depend on the facts and applicable law.